Takenoko Nyokki
A continuous-time model of strategic delay and simultaneous action, motivated by a Japanese coordination game and human response-time distributions.
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Math & Economics @ UC Berkeley
Undergrade at UC Berkeley
Game theory·Mechanism design
Explore research
INCENTIVES
shape behavior
EQUILIBRIUM SET
E ⊆ S
Selected projects
Questions at the intersection of strategic interaction, market design, and technological change.
A continuous-time model of strategic delay and simultaneous action, motivated by a Japanese coordination game and human response-time distributions.
Exploring how cloning, permutation, and consistency properties can characterize correlated equilibrium across spaces of normal-form games.
A task-level approach to AI substitution that restores heterogeneity in task quality, costs, and worker information beyond canonical job-level models.
Jul 2026
Quantitative literary analysis on works from Tanzania, Indonesia, and Paraguay
Notes & essays
Shorter arguments, research notes, and works in progress shared outside the formal paper format.
A literature-led note on coordination, beliefs, and the theoretical mechanisms behind monetary collapse.
ForthcomingNotes on continuous task spaces, CES aggregation, and what job-level models conceal about AI adoption.
ForthcomingA concise map of calibration, regret, and the informational foundations of correlated play.
Forthcoming